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Freedom of Association
William J. Hotes* and Catherine H. Hotes**
N THE 1958 CASE OF N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama,1 the Supreme Court
of the United States announced a new concept of constitu-
tional law called "freedom of association." Using this phrase
for the first time in a constitutional holding, the Court unani-
mously determined that an individual member of an unpopular
group had a "freedom of association" which the Court would
protect against state action as a "liberty" within the meaning
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
is not the first decision to protect individuals from governmental
interference with their affiliations with unpopular organizations,
but it is the first to base this protection on a constitutional
"freedom of association."
The conflict between the N.A.A.C.P. and Alabama arose when
the state, in 1956, brought an equity suit in a state court to en-
join the Association from further activities within the state be-
cause the Association, a New York non-profit membership cor-
poration, had failed to qualify as a foreign corporation doing
business within the state. The N.A.A.C.P. admitted its activities
but claimed an exemption from the statute's application. The
state denied this exemption and alleged irreparable injury to
the property and civil rights of the citizens of Alabama. The
trial court, on state's motion, ordered the production of the As-
sociation's records, including a list of the names and addresses of
all Alabama members. The defendant produced everything re-
quired except the membership lists, claiming that the state could
not constitutionally compel it to disclose this information. For
this refusal, the Association was convicted for contempt and fined
$100,000. The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari,2 and
from this denial the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.3
In deciding whether the petitioner had standing to assert the
constitutional rights of its members, the Court followed its more
recent holdings in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Mc-
Grath4 and Barrows v. Jackson5 and held that representatives
*A.B. in Government, Denison Univ.; Senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School.
** A.B. in Economics, Flora Stone Mather College, Wes. Res. Univ.; Senior
at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 357 U. S. 449 (1958). Commented upon in 25 Brooklyn L. R. 122 (1958);
54 Nw. U. L. R. 390 (1959); 20 Ohio St. L. J. 123 (1959).
2 265 Ala. 349, 91 So. 2d 214 (1956).
3 353 U. S. 972 (1957).
4 341 U. S. 123, 183-187 (1951).
5 346 U. S. 249 (1953).
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have standing where the constitutional rights of persons not be-
fore the Court can be protected effectively only through repre-
sentation. The Court was then able to consider whether 'he dis-
closure order constituted an unwarranted infringement upon
the members' freedom of association.0 The Court recognized that
disclosure of affiliation with a group publicly advocating an un-
popular position is likely to restrain one's free association with
such a group, pointing out that revelation of the identity of
N. A. A. C. P. rank-and-fie members in the past had exposed
those members to economic reprisal, physical coercion, and other
manifestations of public hostility.
To determine whether a limitation upon freedom of associa-
tion by a state is constitutionally justified, the Court must balance
the interests of those individuals whose rights have been re-
stricted against the interests of the state involved. Constitu-
tional freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment may be
restricted only when the state has a compelling interest.7 A state
may take action in the interest of public safety, health, or wel-
fare to prevent abuse of the exercise of these freedoms, but it
may not curtail the rights themselves.8 Only the public interest
or a clear and present danger would justify restriction of First
Amendment freedoms.9
The Court concluded that Alabama did not have a compel-
ling interest to justify disclosure by the N. A. A. C. P. of the
names of its members. Such disclosure would have no bearing
on the question of whether the Association is subject to the
state's registration statute. Inasmuch as the Association had al-
ready complied with the other items demanded by the produc-
tion order (list of officers, total number of members, and amount
of dues), the names of the members would have significantly
6 United States Constitution, Amendment I: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Sec.
2: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to thejurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." See also: Straub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S.
313, 321 (1958); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 324 (1937); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353,
364 (1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666 (1925).
7 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 265 (1957).
8 Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160 (1939); Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S.
496, 515-516 (1939); DeJonge v. Oregon, supra, n. 6, 364-365.
9 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530 (1945). See also: W. Va. State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 639 (1943); Bridges v. California,
314 U. S. 252 (1941); Gitlow v. New York, supra, n. 6, 672; Schenk v.
United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919).
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol10/iss1/13
10 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
added to the inquiry. An invasion of the members' constitu-
tional right of freedom of association in this manner was held
to be unwarranted.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this right of freedom of as-
sociation in Bates v. City of Little Rock 10 in which it was held
that a city could not constitutionally require the local treasurer
of the N. A. A. C. P. to disclose the local membership to de-
termine whether the N.A.A.C.P. was entitled to a charitable
exemption from a municipal license tax.
To evaluate and understand the importance of this recently
declared right of association, it is necessary to examine the back-
ground and legal setting from which this right emerged.
Government has always been confronted with the problem
of suppression of unpopular organizations. Governmental at-
tempts at suppression have, in turn, created for the courts the
problem of delineating individual rights with respect to the
groups involved. An additional complicating factor is the fluctua-
tion of public opinion. Tenets of an organization generally held
to be undesirable during a certain period of time may there-
after be readily accepted by the public at large. Every type of
association has at one time or another been considered sub-
versive. Religious wars in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies reflect this belief about churches. In the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, common law doctrines of conspiracy ap-
plied to labor unions manifest the same conviction. The history
of freemasonry shows that even fraternal groups have not been
free from suspicion. History indicates that opinion about the
subversive nature of groups has differed among different so-
cieties at the same time and also has changed in the same society
over a period of time.
Confronted with the desirability of suppressing an organi-
zation, a governmental group may use one or more of the fol-
lowing approaches: (1) enforce criminal laws; (2) apply ad-
ministrative and regulatory powers; (3) bring the pressure of
public opinion against the group and its members.
Enforcement of Criminal Laws
Of course, the easiest way to hinder an organization's ef-
fectiveness is to apprehend its members in the performance of
overt criminal acts and to prosecute them in accordance with
the law. However, this is not possible when no actual crime has
been committed or proof of the crime is not available.
The common law theories of conspiracy have frequently been
used to establish a criminal action. Criminal conspiracy was an
offense known to ancient English common law and, although it
has often been altered by statute, it remains an indictable offense
in many of the United States. A conspiracy at common law has
generally been defined as a combination between two or more
10 361 U. S. 516 (1960).
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persons by concerted action to accomplish a criminal or unlawful
purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by
criminal or unlawful means." As early as 1805, this approach
was used in Philadelphia Cordwainers,12 during the early nine-
teenth century, it was followed in other legal attacks on striking
unions, mostly of bootmakers and shoemakers.' It was said that
a conspiracy among journeymen to raise their wages was an in-
dictable offense at common law14 and that "a combination of
workmen to raise the price of labor, or of employers to depress
it, was unlawful because [it was considered that] such combina-
tion interfered with the price which would otherwise be regu-
lated by supply and demand." 15 However, this doctrine was re-
pudiated in the 1842 Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v.
Hunt 6 as not being adapted to prevailing conditions in this coun-
try.
The most common statutory alteration of the common law
offense of conspiracy is to require that some overt act be com-
mitted toward effecting the object of the conspiracy, except in
cases specially excepted by statute from its operation. For ex-
ample, the Tennessee statute reads: "No agreement shall be
deemed a conspiracy unless some act be done to effect the ob-ject thereof, except an agreement to commit a felony on the per-
son of another, or to commit the crimes of arson or burglary." 16a
Also under the federal statutes, some overt act is usually a
necessary element of a conspiracy to commit any offense against
the United States,'7 although some conspiracies denounced by a
federal statute are indictable without the commission of any overt
act.' 8 It has been declared, however, in a number of decisions
that, notwithstanding the fact that an overt act is made neces-
sary by statute, the offense does not consist of both the con-
11 15 C. J. S. Conspiracy, Sec. 1 (1939).
12 3 Commons and Gilmore, A Documentary History of American Indus-
trial Society, 59 (1910). See also Nelles, The First American Labor Case,
41 Yale L. J. 165 (1931).
13 See Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 32 Colum. L. R. 1128 (1932).
14 People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9, 28 Am. Dec. 501 (N. Y. 1835).
15 Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. 420, 429, 28 A. 190 (1894).
16 45 Mass. 111 (1842).
'16 Tenn. Code Ann., Sec. 39-1102 (1956). The requirement of an overt act
also exists in Arizona (Pen. Code, 1913, Sec. 169, 1045); California (Pen.
Code, Sec. 184); Kansas (State v. Robinson, 124 Kan. 245, 259 P. 691, 1927);
Maine (State v. Clary, 64 Me. 369, 1875); Minnesota (G. S. 1913, Sec. 8595-
8596); Missouri (Rev. St. 1899, Sec. 2153); New Jersey (S. A. 2A:98-2);
New York (Pen. Law 580); Utah (State v. McIntyre, 92 Utah 177, 66 P. 2d
879, 1937); Wisconsin (Rev. St. 1898, Sec. 4568).
17 Brady v. U. S., 24 F. 2d 405 (8th Cir. 1928), 59 A. L. R. 563; U. S. v.
Baker, 243 F. 741 (D. C. R. I. 1917).
18 Enfield v. U. S., 261 F. 141 (8th Cir. 1919); Orear v. U. S., 261 F. 257 (5th
Cir. 1919); Bryant v. U. S., 257 F. 378 (5th Cir. 1919).
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spiracy and the acts done to effect it, but of the conspiracy
alone, 9 which still remains the gist of the offense.
20
If no actual crime has been committed or if proof is not
available, the reach of the law may be extended by a statute
which provides for prima facie presumption upon proof of other
acts which the legislature considers to be indicative of intent to
commit a crime. Tennessee, where the Ku Klux Klan was born,
used this as one of the methods for suppressing the Klan. In
1869, the Tennessee Legislature decreed:
If any person or persons, disguised or in mask, by day or by
night, shall enter upon the premises of another, or demand
entrance or admission into the house or inclosure of any
citizen of this state, it shall be considered prima facie that
his or her intention is to commit a felony, and such demand
shall be deemed an assault with intent to commit a felony,
and the person or persons so offending, shall, upon con-
viction, be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not
less than ten (10) years nor more than twenty (20) years.2 1
Section 1 of the same Act 22 makes it a misdemeanor to prowl
masked or in disguise, disturbing the peace or alarming the citi-
zens, and Section 323 provides that one committing assault with
a deadly weapon while masked shall be guilty of assault with
intent to commit murder in the first degree. In Walpole v. State,24
the Tennessee court held that the object and purpose of this law
was to strike at offenses committed in masquerade, to make them
more highly penal because of the inherent difficulty of identify-
ing offenders who wore masks, in order to secure immunity from
detection.
A "hood and mask" statute was passed by the Louisiana
legislature in 192425 which makes it a misdemeanor to wear a
hood or mask in a public place. The penalty for violation of this
statute is imprisonment from six months to three years.
When a new masked order, the White Caps, arose in Ten-
nessee near the end of the nineteenth century, the state legisla-
19 Asgill v. U. S., 60 F. 2d 780 (4th Cir. 1932); Bell v. U. S., 2 F. 2d 543
(8th Cir. 1924); Meyers v. U. S., 36 F. 2d 859 (3rd Cir. 1929), cert. den.
281 U. S. 735 (1930).
20 Meyers v. U. S., supra, n. 19; U. S. v. Olmstead, 5 F. 2d 712 (D. C. Wash.
1925); Wilson v. U. S., 275 F. 307 (2nd Cir. 1921), cert. den. 257 U. S. 649
(1922).
21 Public Acts 1869-1870, Ch. 54, Sec. 2, Tenn. Code Ann. See. 39-2802
(1956).
22 Tenn Code Ann. Sec. 39-2801 (1956).
23 Ibid, Sec. 39-2803 (1956).
24 68 Tenn. 370, 9 Baxt. 370 (1878).
25 La. Rev. Stat. of 1950, 14:312. For other "hood and mask" statutes, see:
California (Deering's Penal Code, Sec. 185, 1959); Florida (Florida Statutes,
1957, Sec. 876.20); Arizona (Revised Statutes Criminal Code 13-981-983);
Alabama (Code of Alabama, 1958, 14:358-1); Arkansas (Ark. Statutes,
1947, 41-2602); New Mexico (Statutes 1941, 41-2901, 2906).
Jan., 1961
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1961
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
ture passed a drastic statute26 which made it a felony to conspire
to take human life, "or to engage in any act reasonably cal-
culated to cause the loss of life . . . or to inflict corporal punish-
ment or injury . . . or to burn or otherwise destroy property or
to feloniously take the same." The statute extended the penalty
to anyone who directly or indirectly aided or abetted or en-
couraged anyone else to engage in such conspiracy. In 1941, the
Tennessee Supreme Court reaffirmed that the statute was aimed
at the White Caps and declined to apply it to members of the
local union of the United Mine Workers of America convicted of
conspiring to inflict serious bodily injuries on the foreman of a
mine, a non-union employee.27
A federal act aimed at the Ku Klux Klan was enacted in
1871.28 This act provided:
If two or more persons within any State or Territory of the
United States . . . shall conspire together; or go in disguise
upon the highway or on the premises of another for the
purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, of de-
priving any person or class of persons of the equal protec-
tion of the laws or of equal privileges or immunities under
the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the
constituted authorities of any State from giving or securing
to all persons within such State the equal protection of the
laws . . . [each of said persons shall be punished.]
This act was more effective than the state legislation and prac-
tically stopped outrages in 1872. After having done its work, it
was declared unconstitutional in United States v. Harris29 in
which the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
gave Congress no power to legislate against the acts of in-
dividuals.
A red flag also came to be viewed by many state legislatures
as a symbol of a new criminal category. The flag was considered
to be the manifestation of a threat which justified legislation
directed at communist and socialist groups. In the 1908 case of
People v. Burnam,30 display of a red flag was ruled a proper
basis for conviction under a riot statute which did not mention
flags, because the flag tended to incite riots.
Defendants knew this red flag was hated by those to whom
it was displayed, because it was believed to represent senti-
ments detestable to every lover of our form of government.
They knew that it would excite fears and apprehension, and
that by displaying it they would provoke violence and dis-
26 Public Acts 1897, Ch. 52 (Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 39-1106-7, 1956).
27 Asbury v. State, 178 Tenn. 43, 154 S. W. 2d 794 (1941).
28 Ch. 22, Sec. 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), R. S. Sec. 5519 (1873).
29 106 U. S. 629 (1883).
30 154 Mich. 150, 117 N. W. 589 (1908).
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order. Their right to display a red flag was subordinate to
the right of the public. They had no right to display it when
the natural and inevitable consequence was to destroy the
public peace and tranquillity.3 1
In 1920 and 1921, thirty-three states adopted "red flag" laws. The
New York Statute makes it a misdemeanor to display the banner
"in any public assembly or parade as a symbol or emblem of any
organization or association, or in furtherance of any political,
social, or economic principle, doctrine or propaganda." Other
states go much further and forbid the display of the red flag
anywhere. Some shrewdly guard against the wearing of red
neckties or buttons or the evasive adoption of a green flag by
punishing the use of any emblem of any hue if it is "distinctive
of bolshevism, anarchism, or radical socialist"; or indicates
"sympathy or support of ideals, institutions, or forms of govern-
ment hostile, inimical, or antagonistic to the form or spirit of the
constitution, laws, ideals, and institutions of this state or of the
United States.3 2
The reported cases prosecuted under these laws are not as
numerous as might have been expected from the number of
states adopting them. In Commonwealth v. Karvonen,33 a Massa-
chusetts statute prohibiting the carrying of any red or black flags
in parades was upheld. The court said that, inasmuch as a red
flag is well recognized as a revolutionary and terroristic emblem,
it may be assumed that the Legislature regarded it as the
symbol of ideas hostile to established order, and decided
that its carrying in parades would be likely to provoke tur-
bulence or to menace the safety of travelers or citizens in
general, or otherwise to interfere with the common welfare.
Its determination in this regard cannot be pronounced by the
courts contrary to the fundamental law, as being arbitrary
or unreasonable, or as having clearly no relation to the ends
for which the police power may be exercised.34
However, in Ex Parte Hartman,35 a similar Los Angeles
ordinance was invalidated:
Nothing would seem to be more certain than that the in-
habitants of the United States have both individually and
collectively the right to advocate peaceable changes in our
Constitution, laws or form of government, although such
changes may be based upon theories or principles of govern-
ment antagonistic to those which now serve as their basis.
And it seems equally certain that an organization peaceably
31 Id., at 592.
32 Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, 159 (1941).
33 219 Mass. 306, 106 N. E. 556 (1914).
34 Id., at 557.
35 182 Cal. 447, 188 P. 548 (1920).
Jan., 1961
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advocating such changes may adopt a flag or emblem signify-
ing its purpose, and that the display or possession of such
flag or emblem cannot be made an unlawful act.30
The only red flag case which reached the Supreme Court of
the United States involved daily youth camp pledges of allegiance
to the hammer and sickle banner of the Communist Party in the
United States, identical to the flag of the Soviet Union.37 The
Supreme Court held unconstitutional the provision of the Cali-
fornia statute making it a felony for any person to display a red
flag, as a sign, symbol, or emblem "of opposition to organized
government, "construed as including peaceful and orderly oppo-
sition to government by legal means. The Court took the view,
however, that the other provisions of the statute, forbidding the
public display of a flag as "an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic
action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a suspicious char-
acter," were constitutional, as construed by the state court to
relate to advocacy of or incitement to force or violence in the
overthrow of government. The court thus made the distinction,
which is recognized in other decisions, between peaceable and
forcible means to effect political or social changes, as regards
the constitutionality of legislation of the kind under consider-
ation.
The most extreme criminal statute directed against a cer-
tain group or association would prohibit all the organization's
activities, including membership in it. An advance step in this
direction was made by the criminal syndicalism statutes. These
statutes, enacted in the years following the entry of the United
States into World War I, were the result of immediate post-
war psychology, the activities of the Industrial Workers of theWorld and the Communists, and old problems of economic and
political dissatisfaction, combined with new labor problems. The
Idaho statute, originally enacted in 1917 and amended in 1925,
defines criminal syndicalism as follows:
Criminal syndicalism is the doctrine which wilfully and
maliciously advocates crime, sabotage . . . violence, or un-
lawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplished in-
dustrial or political reform. The advocacy of such doctrine,
whether by word of mouth or writing, is a felony. .. 38
By 1922, nineteen states, as well as Hawaii and Alaska, had
passed similar laws.3 9 The California statute40 was one of the
36 Id., at 549. See also: Annotations, 20 A. L. R. 1548 (1922), 40 A. L. R.
958 (1926), and 73 A. L. R. 1500 (1931).
37 Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931).
38 Idaho Code Ann. Sec. 18-2002 (1947).
39 Alaska Acts 1919, c. 6; Ariz. Acts 1918, c. 13; Cal. Stats. 1919, c. 188;
Hawaii Acts 1919, c. 186 and Supp. Acts, 1921, c. 216; Idaho Acts 1917, c. 145,
amended Acts 1919, c. 136; Ind. Acts 1919, c. 125; Ia. Laws 1919, c. 372; Kan.
(Continued on next page)
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most diligently enforced. It provides for imprisonment from one
to fourteen years of anyone who advocates, teaches, aids, abets,
wilfully attempts to justify or publishes or circulates matter ad-
vocating or advising criminal syndicalism, or who organizes, as-
sists in organizing, or knowingly becomes a member of any group
organized to advocate it. The constitutionality of the California
statute was sustained in Whitney v. California.41 It was held that
the statute was not violative of the due process and equal pro-
tection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, either by reason
of vagueness and uncertainty of definition, or on the ground that
its penalties were confined to those who advocated a resort to
violent and unlawful methods as a means of changing industrial
and political conditions, and that it arbitrarily discriminated be-
tween such persons and those who might advocate a resort to
these methods as a means of maintaining such conditions. It was
held that the statute did not constitute unlawful class legisla-
tion, or an unconstitutional restraint of the right to free speech
and assembly.
On the same day the Supreme Court of the United States
upheld the California law, however, it reversed a conviction
under a similar Kansas law. In Fiske v. Kansas,4 2 it was held
that the Kansas syndicalism statute, as applied in this instance,
constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police
power of the state, and unwarrantedly infringed the liberty of
the defendant, in violation of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Court pointed out that the advocacy in
this instance was not of violent means for overthrow of the exist-
ing social order. The defendant, an I. W. W. organizer, was con-
victed of advocating criminal syndicalism primarily on the basis
of the preamble of the union's constitution which did not men-
tion violence but only an unceasing struggle between the work-
ing class and the employing class.
For the most part, the criminal syndicalism statutes were
upheld in state appellate courts 43 and remained on the books.
Ten years after the Whitney and Fiske cases, in 1937, the Su-
preme Court of the United States considered an Oregon syndi-
calism statute in DeJonge v. State of Oregon.44 DeJonge spoke
(Continued from preceding page)
Laws 1920, c. 37; Mich. Acts 1919, c. 255; Minn. Acts 1917, c. 215; Mont. Acts
1918, c. 7; Nebraska Acts 1918, c. 9, Acts 1919, c. 261; Nevada Stat. 1919,
c. 22; N. Dak. Acts 1918, c. 12; Ohio Acts 1919, p. 189; Okla. Acts 1919, c. 70;
Oregon Acts 1919, c. 12, and 1921, c. 34; S. Dakota Acts 1918, c. 38; Utah
Acts 1919, c. 127; Wash. Acts 1919, c. 173, 174; Wyoming Acts 1919, c. 76.
40 Cal. Gen. Laws Ann. Act 8428, Sec. 1 (Deering 1954).
41 274 U. S. 357 (1927), affg. 57 Cal. App. 449, 207 P. 693 (1922).
42 274 U. S. 380 (1927), reversing 117 Kan. 69, 230 P. 88 (1924).
43 These cases are collected in Annotations, 1 A. L. R. 336 (1919), 20
A. L. R. 1543 (1922), and 73 A. L. R. 1498 (1931).
44 Supra, n. 6.
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at a meeting called by the Communist Party in protest of police
activity during a longshoremen's strike in Portland in 1934. He
was convicted under a provision of the Oregon statute prohibiting
anyone from assisting in conducting a meeting of a group which
advocated criminal syndicalism, even though the stipulation of
facts was that there was no evidence of any syndicalism at the
meeting. The Supreme Court held this application of the Oregon
statute to be unconstitutional as repugnant to the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court said:
If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere,
if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against
the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their
conspiracy or other violation of valid laws. But it is a dif-
ferent matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them
for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peace-
able assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for
a criminal charge.
4 5
The Court pointed out that, irrespective of the objectives of the
Communist Party, the defendant still enjoyed his personal right
of free speech and to take part in a peaceable assembly having a
lawful purpose, although called by the Communist Party.
The most direct thrust against the Communist Party by
Congress was the passage and enforcement of the Smith Act of
June 28, 7940.46 The portions of the act invoked against the
leaders of the national party provided, at the time of the case:
Sec. 2. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) To knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or
teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of
overthrowing or destroying any government in the
United States by force or violence, or by the assassi-
nation of any officer of such government;
(2) with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any
government in the United States, to print, publish, edit,
issue, circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly display any
written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teach-
ing the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of
overthrowing or destroying any government in the
United States by force or violence;
(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group, or
assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage
the overthrow or destruction of any government in the
United States by force or violence; or to be or become
a member of, or affiliate with, any such society, group,
or assembly of persons, knowing the purpose thereof.
45 Id., at 365.
46 54 Stat. 670 (1940), recodified 62 Stat. 808 (1948), 18 U. S. C. 2385 (1952).
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Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt to
commit, or to conspire to commit, any of the acts pro-
hibited by the provisions of . . . this title.
The law denounces a conspiracy to form, or affiliate with, an
organization whose purpose it is to advocate the overthrow of
government by force or violence. The broad possibilities sug-
gested by the words of this statute have been narrowed by the
construction placed upon the statute by the federal courts. In
Dennis v. United States,47 the top leaders of the Communist Party
were convicted of violating the act, and the Supreme Court of the
United States upheld the conviction. Chief Justice Vinson wote,
in the opinion of the court:
The mere fact that from the period 1945 to 1948 petitioners'
activities did not result in an attempt to overthrow the Gov-
ernment by force and violence is of course no answer to the
fact that there was a group that was ready to make the at-
tempt. The formation by petitioners of such a highly or-
ganized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members sub-
ject to call when the leaders, these petitioners, felt that the
time had come for action, coupled with the inflammable
nature of world conditions, similar uprisings in other coun-
tries, and the touch-and-go nature of our relations with
countries with whom petitioners were in the very least
ideologically attuned, convince us that their convictions were
justified on this score.48
Six years later, in Yates v. United States,40 the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the advocacy which will
support conviction must not be merely of abstract doctrine but
"of a rule or principle of action and by language reasonably
and ordinarily calculated to incite persons to such action, all
with the intent to cause the overthrow" of the government.50
Congress itself apparently limited the broad nature of the
Smith Act conspiracy provisions in the Subversive Activities Con-
trol Act of 1950,5 1 by providing:
(f) Neither the holding of office nor membership in any
Communist organization by any person shall constitute
per se a violation of subsection (a) or subsection (c)
of this section or of any other criminal statute...
In the same Act, Congress provided a new criminal offense-
conspiring to do any act which would substantially contribute
to establishing a dictatorship-and also set up administrative
47 341 U. S. 494 (1951).
48 Id., at 510-511.
49 354 U. S. 298 (1957).
50 Id., at 326.
51 64 Stat. 987, 50 U. S. C. Sec. 783 (f) (1952).
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procedures.5 2 This act was held valid in Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Board.
53
Administrative and Regulatory Powers
In addition to enforcement of criminal laws, suppression of
an organization may be accomplished by the stringent applica-
tion of administrative and regulatory powers. The practical
power of local officials to discriminate between groups on the
52 Section 786 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 requires all
Communist organizations to register with the Attorney General and to file
statements giving the names of its officers, full details of the sources of
funds and purposes of expenditures, and, in the case of "Communist-action
organizations," a full list of names and addresses of members. It requires
the organizations to keep full records.
Section 787 requires members of "Communist-action organizations" to
register individually.
Section 788 sets out the duties of the Attorney General in administer-
ing the Act, including the duty to make the registers available for public
inspection, and reporting to the President and Congress.
Sections 791-792 establish a Subversive Activities Control Board to de-
termine whether an organization comes within the purview of the Act, and
establishes its procedures; Section 793 provides for judicial review.
Section 783 denounces three criminal offenses-conspiracy or attempt
to establish a dictatorship, communication of classified information, and re:-
ceipt of such information. It provides a penalty of up to ten years and
$10,000 for violation and a ten-year limitation on prosecution for these
offenses. It also provides that holding office or membership in a Commu-
nist organization shall not be per se a violation of these or any other
criminal provisions and that registration as officers or members shall not
be admitted as evidence against them in criminal prosecutions.
Section 784 forbids anybody to conceal membership in a registered or-
ganization when seeking, accepting or holding federal or defense jobs, for
any member of such an organization to hold a federal job, or for any mem-
ber of a registered "Communist-action organization" to hold a defense job.
Section 785 denies passports to members of registered organizations.
Section 789 provides that when a registered organization disseminates
matter by mail, interstate commerce or on the airwaves, the source must
be identified as a Communist organization.
Section 790 denies income tax deductions and exemptions for registered
organizations.
Section 794 provides penalties for violation of registration provisions,
and Section 797 provides penalties for violation of security regulations and
orders.
53 223 F. 2d 531 (D. C. D. C. 1954), rev'd. on other grounds, 351 U. S. 115
(1956). The court said, at p. 544, "The activities of a world Communist
movement such as that described in this statute and of organizations in
this country devoted to its objectives constitute a clear and present danger
within the meaning of any definition of the point at which freedom of
speech gives way to the requirements of government security. The basic
theory of Communism that all presently existing nationalist governments
be superseded by a stateless world organization under a proletarian dicta-
torship, the domination of one world power with all its assets by the Com-
munists, the succession of national capitulations to the forces of that group,
and the declared intentions of its leaders in respect to the remainder of the
world, are reflected in the recitations in this statute and, moreover, are
historic facts which cannot be disputed. We cannot at the present time
treat the program and policies of the world Communist movement as a
dialectic debate."
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basis of personal judgment can be illustrated by cases involving
the necessity for obtaining permits for public meetings. In
Niemotko v. Maryland,54 the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the convictions of some Jehovah's Witnesses for holding
a meeting in a public park without a permit. Apparently, the
permit had been denied by the Havre de Grace, Maryland, city
council because of the council's dissatisfaction with certain of
the Witnesses' views. The City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island,
banned all religious and political addresses in its parks and al-
lowed assemblies in the parks without a permit as long as no pub-
lic address was made. However, it did not always enforce the
speech ban against religious groups and, when it did obtain a
conviction under the statute, it was held to be discriminatory. 55
In Poulos v. New Hampshire,56 the Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed a New Hampshire conviction of a Jeho-
vah's Witness who preached in a park without a permit. The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire had held that a preacher's
relief from improper denial of a license to use a public park was
an action in mandamus to require the officials of Portsmouth,
New Hampshire, to issue the desired permit.
Similar opportunities for discrimination exist at the state
level, particularly corporate, license, and taxation laws. Prob-
ably the most widely used regulation in this respect is the require-
ment for registration of foreign corporations. With regard to
local activities within the state, a state may exclude a foreign
corporation or prescribe the conditions for entrance. Although
this principle has been held to be equally applicable to non-
profit corporations as well as to commercial enterprises, most of
the decisions are concerned with the capacity of the corporation
in relation to civil actions rather than efforts by a state to ex-
clude the corporation.57
However, two cases concerning the Ku Klux Klan, a non-
profit corporation, are State ex rel. Griffith v. Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan58 and Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Common-
wealth.59 In Griffith, Kansas based its quo warranto action on
two counts: (1) that the Klan, a Georgia corporation, was a
foreign corporation doing business in Kansas without the re-
quired permission from the state charter board, and (2) that it
was agitating race and religious prejudices and using threats,
54 340 U. S. 268 (1951).
55 Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67 (1953).
56 345 U. S. 395 (1953).
57 General Conference of Free Baptists v. Berkey, 156 Cal. 466, 105 P. 411
(1909); High v. Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of the Moose, 206
Minn. 599, 289 N. W. 519 (1940). But see: Eaton v. Woman's Home Mis-
sionary Society of The Methodist Episcopal Church, 264 Ill. 88, 105 N. E.
746 (1914).
58 117 Kan. 546, 232 P. 254 (1925).
59 138 Va. 500, 122 S. E. 122 (1924).
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intimidations and violence to compel others to agree with its
views and obey their commands. The Kansas court accepted a
commissioner's finding that there was no evidence to support
the second count, but the writ of ouster was granted because the
Klan was doing business in the state without permission. In the
other case, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld a
fine levied against the Ku Klux Klan for doing business in the
state without complying with its registration statute. The Klan
contended that it was being discriminated against because similar
actions had not been taken against other foreign organizations,
but the court did not consider this contention.
In another case involving a non-profit corporation, People v.
Jewish Consumptives' Relief Society,60 a New York court granted
a temporary injunction to restrain the Society, a non-stock
foreign corporation, from raising funds in New York, an activity
found to be unauthorized by the corporation's certificate to do
business in New York.
In the field of taxation, California, which had been very
active in the enforcement of criminal syndicalism laws, passed a
constitutional amendment in 195261 which provides that no person
or organization which advocates the overthrow of the govern-
ment by force or violence or other unlawful means or who ad-
vocates the support of a foreign government against the United
States in the event of hostilities shall receive any tax exemption
from any agency of the state. In 1953 California provided for a
test oath as a means of enforcing the constitutional provision.6 2
This statute requires that any one who claims a tax exemption
(other than a householder's exemption) must include a declara-
tion that he does not advocate the overthrow of the government
or advocate the support of a foreign government against the
United States. The Supreme Court of California upheld the
constitutional amendment and the statute.63 The court said that
the limitation imposed by the constitutional amendment
is not a limitation on mere belief but is a limitation on
action-the advocacy of certain prescribed conduct. What
one may merely believe is not prohibited. It is only advocates
of the subversive doctrines who are affected. Advocacy con-
stitutes action and the instigation of action, not mere belief
or opinion.64
60 92 N. Y. S. 2d 157 (1949).
61 Cal. Const. Art. XX, Sec. 19.
62 Cal. Rev. and Tax Code, See. 32 (Deering Supp. 1957).
63 First Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 2d 419, 311 P. 2d 508
(1957); Prince v. San Francisco, 48 Cal. 2d 472, 311 P. 2d 544 (1957);
People's Church v. Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 2d 899, 311 P. 2d 540 (1957);
Speiser v. Randall, 48 Cal. 2d 903, 311 P. 2d 546 (1957).
64 First Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 2d at 428, 311 P. 2d at
517.
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol10/iss1/13
10 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
On certiorari of the four cases involved, the Supreme Court of
the United States reversed, 5 pointing out that
when the constitutional right to speak is sought to be deterred
by a State's general taxing program due process demands that
the speech be unencumbered until the State comes forward
with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition. The State clearly
has no such compelling interest at stake to justify a short-
cut procedure which must inevitably result in suppressing
protected speech. Accordingly, though the validity of Sec.
19 of Art. XX of the State Constitution be conceded argu-
endo, its enforcement through procedures which place the
burdens of proof and persuasion on the taxpayer is a viola-
tion of due process. 6
The Court distinguished previous cases in which it had sustained
the validity of loyalty oaths required of public employees,6
7
candidates for public office,s and officers of labor unions,69 by
saying, "In these cases, however, there was no attempt directly
to control speech but rather to protect, from an evil shown to
be grave, some interest clearly within the sphere of govern-
mental concern." 70
Basing his proclamation on both the tax power and the power
to exclude foreign corporations, Governor Fabus in 1958 an-
nounced that fifty-two foreign corporations, including the
N. A. A. C. P., who were delinquent in payment of franchise
taxes, had forfeited all rights to do business in Arkansas and
were dissolved or withdrawn. 71
A natural means of attack against political parties and
other organizations having political objectives are election laws.
In 1935 Arkansas provided for a denial of a place on the ballot
for candidates of any party advocating the overthrow of the
government by force. 72 This action was amended in 1941 to name
the Communist Party specifically.73 The statute was upheld in
65 Speiser v. Randall, Prince v. San Francisco, 357 U. S. 513 (1958); First
Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles, Valley Unitarian-Universalist Church(previously People's Church) v. Los Angeles, 357 U. S. 545 (1958).
66 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. at 528-29.
67 Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716 (1951).
68 Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U. S. 56 (1951).
69 American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (1950).
70 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. at 527.
71 Proclamation of Governor Orval E. Faubus, February 12, 1958. For other
cases on licensing and tax regulations affecting free speech, see Annotations,
93 L. Ed. 1180, 1182 (1950). Cases involving the validity of governmental
requirements for loyalty oaths are collected in Annotations, 97 L. Ed. 226
(1954), 18 A. L. R. 2d 268 (1951).
72 Ark. Acts 1935, No. 33, Sec. 1.
73 Ark. Acts 1941, No. 293, Sec. 1, as amended, Ark. Stat., Sec. 3-160405
(1947).
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Field v. Ha1U4 in which the Supreme Court of Arkansas declared
that state legislatures have authority to establish conditions
precedent to the existence and operation of political parties.
An Illinois statute requires that petitions to form and nomi-
nate candidates for a new political party must bear the signatures
of at least 25,000 qualified voters, including at least 200 voters
in each of at least 50 of the state's 102 counties.7 5 The action of
state officials on the authority of this statute in refusing to per-
mit Progressive Party candidates on the ballot in the general
election of 1948 was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United
States in MacDougall v. Green.70
It is allowable State policy to require that candidates for
state-wide office should have support not limited to a con-
centrated locality. This is not a unique policy. See N. Y.
Laws 1896, c. 909, sec. 57, now N. Y. Elec. Law sec. 137 (4);
113 Laws of Ohio 349, General Code Sec. 4785-91 (1929),
now Ohio Code Ann. (Cum. Supp. 1947) Sec. 4785-91; Mass.
Acts 1943, c. 334, sec. 2, now Mass. Ann. Laws c. 53, sec. 6
(1945) .77
Publicity
The most direct way a legislative body may proceed against
a particular group is to use its investigative powers to bring in the
members and officers for questioning. Theoretically, this power
is incidental to the law making functions and is to be used in
obtaining information on which to base legislative decisions.
However, legislators often frankly state that their real purpose
in a given investigation is exposure, 7s and official reports of
committees sometimes display a similar frankness.7 9 However,
74 201 Ark. 77, 143 S. W. 2d 567 (1940).
75 Ill. Ann. Stat., C. 46, Sec. 10-2 (1947).
76 335 U. S. 281 (1948).
77 Id., at 283.
78 Martin Dies, first chairman of the House Un-American Activities Com-
mittee, said, "I am not in a position to say whether we can legislate effec-
tively in reference to this matter, but I do know that exposure in a de-
mocracy of subversive activities is the most effective weapon that we have
in our possession. Always we must keep in mind that in any legislative
attempt to prevent un-American activities, we might jeopardize funda-
mental rights far more important than the objective we seek, but when
these activities are exposed, when the light of day is brought to bear upon
them, we can trust public sentiment in this country to do the rest." 83
Cong. Rec. 7570 (1938).
79 In a report to the House of Representatives, the House Un-American
Activities Committee said, "While Congress does not have the power to
deny to citizens the right to believe in, teach, or advocate, communism,
fascism, and nazism, it does have the right to focus the spotlight of pub-
licity upon their activities." H. R. Rep. No. 2, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 13.
Footnoted in Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 199 (1957).
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with regard to exposure, the Supreme Court of the United States
said:
We have no doubt that there is no congressional power to
expose for the sake of exposure. The public is, of course,
entitled to be informed concerning the workings of its
government. That cannot be inflated into a general power
to expose where the predominant result can only be an
invasion of the private rights of individuals. But a solution
to our problem is not to be found in testing the motives of
committee members for this purpose. Such is not our
function. Their motives alone would not vitiate an investi-
gation which had been instituted by a House of Congress
if that assembly's legislative purpose is being served. 0
The power of legislatures to apply pressures to individuals
and organizations is great, especially if the matters about which
witnesses are questioned involve violations of law. A dramatic
illustration of this is the investigation of organized crime con-
ducted by a United States Senate committee in 1950.
It has long been settled that Congress can make contempt
of Congress a crime punishable in the courts,s1 and it is also well
established that congressional powers are broad in conducting
legislative investigations.8 2 In the most recent cases, direct con-
tempt powers have been assumed, and the Court's attention has
been focused on the problem of determining when the individual
witness may assert his constitutional rights as a limitation on
those powers. For example, in Flaxer v. United States,8 3 the
Supreme Court of the United States held that, where there was
some ambiguity in a congressional committee's ruling on time
for performance and the witness could easily have concluded
that he had ten days after ruling before being faced with the
alternative of compliance as against contempt, conviction for
contempt of Congress could not be predicated upon the witness'
failure to comply with the ruling on the date thereof. In Watkins
v. United States,8 4 a conviction for contempt of Congress was
reversed as being invalid under the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment, because the witness had not been given the
opportunity to know the relevancy and pertinency of the ques-
tions about his past political associates to the subject of the
investigation, since the subject of the investigation had not been
sufficiently defined.
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 5 the Supreme Court of the
80 Watkins v. U. S., supra, n. 79, at 200.
81 Re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (1897).
82 Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125 (1935); Sinclair v. U. S., 279 U. S.
263 (1929); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927).
83 358 U. S. 147 (1958). See also: Sacher v. U. S., 356 U. S. 576 (1958).
84 Watkins v. U. S., supra, n. 79, at 178.
85 Supra, n. 7.
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United States considered a similar situation brought about by
the activities of a state, rather than a congressional, investigating
committee. Here the witness, a teacher at a state university,
refused to tell the committee: (1) the substance of a lecture he
had given at the university, (2) his and others' activities on
behalf of the Progressive Party in 1948, and (3) anything about
his opinions and beliefs on the ground that such questions were
not pertinent and infringed upon an area protected by the First
Amendment. Chief Justice Warren announced the judgment
of the Court reversing the conviction, stating that "The lack of
any indications that the legislature wanted the information the
Attorney General attempted to elicit from the petitioner must be
treated as the absence of (legislative) authority" 86 to ask the
questions, and on this ground declared the conviction a violation
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Exposure by an investigating committee is necessarily inter-
mittent. When continuous inspection or observation is desired,
legislators may enact some form of registration statute which
enables administrative officials to maintain up-to-date information
on the particular organizations. An example of such legislation
is the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.87
A New York statute of this type brought about the case of
People ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman 8 which has since served
as leading authority to support the power of government to re-
quire disclosure of membership lists for limited classes of organi-
zations. The New York statute 89 provided for registration and
filing of detailed information, including membership lists, by
any association of twenty or more persons which "requires an
oath as a prerequisite or condition of membership, other than
a labor union or benevolent orders of law." It also provided
penalties against the organization and against members who
retain membership although they have knowledge of the organi-
zation's statutory non-compliance. The law was directed at the
Ku Klux Klan. The law was amended two years later to restrict
the definition more closely to the Ku Klux Klan after several
college fraternities had registered under the statute.90 Bryant,
who had been arrested for being a member of the Buffalo Klan
with knowledge that it had not complied with the statute, brought
habeas corpus proceedings in the New York Supreme Court.
This petition was dismissed by that court, and the Appellate
Division affirmed.9 1 All of the appellate courts assumed that
86 Supra, n. 7, at 254.
s7 gtpr-, n. 51.
88 213 App. Div. 414, 210 N. Y. S. 269 (4th Dept., 1925), aff'd. 241 N. Y. 405,
150 N. E. 497 (1926), aff'd. 278 U. S. 63 (1928). See also: 62 A. L. R. 798
(1929).
89 N. Y. Laws 1923, c. 664, as amended, N. Y. Civ. Rights Law, Sec. 53 (Mc-
Kinney 1948).
90 N. Y. Laws 1925, c. 621.
91 Supra, n. 88.
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the law was designed to suppress the Ku Klux Klan, and all of
them upheld the legislature's classification as a legitimate exercise
of the state's police power. The Supreme Court of the United
States discussed briefly but dismissed the relator's claim that
he had a constitutional right under either the privileges and
immunities clause or the due process clause to join a secret, oath-
bound organization. The Court held that the right to be a
member of such an oath-bound society is not an incident of
United States citizenship that is protected by the privileges and
immunities clause. Turning to the due process clause, the Court
said:
The relator's contention under the due process clause is
that the statute deprives him of liberty in that it prevents
him from exercising his right of membership in the associ-
ation. But his liberty in this regard, like most other personal
rights, must yield to the rightful exertion of the police
power. There can be no doubt that under that power the
State may prescribe and apply to associations having an
oath-bound membership any reasonable regulations calcu-
lated to confine their purposes and activities within limits
which are consistent with the rights of others and the public
welfare. . . . The requirement (that each association file
with the Secretary of State copies of its constitution, mem-
bership oath, and list of current members and officers) is
not arbitrary or oppressive, but reasonable and likely to be
of real effect. Of course, power to require the disclosure
includes authority to prevent individual members of an
association which has failed to comply from attending meet-
ings or retaining membership with knowledge of its default.
We conclude that the due process clause is not violated.92
In NAACP v. Alabama,9 3 the Supreme Court of the United
States distinguished the Bryant case on the basis that the Klan
engaged in violence, saying:
that case involved markedly different considerations in
terms of the interest of the State in obtaining disclosure.
. . . The decision was based on the particular character of
the Klan's activities, involving acts of unlawful intimidation
and violence, which the Court assumed was before the state
legislature when it enacted the statute and of which the
Court itself took judicial notice. Furthermore, the situation
before us is significantly different from that in Bryant, be-
cause the organization there had made no effort to comply
with any of the requirements of New York's statute but
rather had refused to furnish the state with any information
as to its local activities. 94
92 Supra, n. 88, 278 U. S. 72-73.
93 Supra, n. 1.
94 Supra, n. 1, at 465-466.
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